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he ongoing selection of the next President of the European Commission has 
underscored the growing importance of the European Parliament in EU decision-
making and in promoting democratic legitimacy at EU level. Strikingly, the new 
Parliament will be more Eurosceptical, radical and fragmented than ever before, which, 
among other things, will constrain the building of majorities to pass legislation and adopt 
decisions. The close relationship between the outcome of the EP elections and the 
governability of the EP should prompt a serious debate on the matter.  
A more Eurosceptic, radical and fragmented legislature 
The elections to the European Parliament substantially modified the political landscape of 
the EU legislature. With only a 30-seats difference between them, the Socialists & Democrats 
(S&D) came much closer to the European People’s Party group (EPP), whose representation 
decreased from 273 to 221 seats. Liberals and Greens also lost ground in favour of the 
European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR), which have become the third-largest political 
group in Parliament. Despite the poor show of its leading partner, the British Conservative 
Party, ECR has successfully negotiated with other parties across Europe to increase its 
membership up to 70 MEPs, which will translate into a higher number of vice-presidencies 
and committee chairs in the new Parliament. Its Polish partner, Law and Justice, fared very 
well in the elections and is now together with the Conservative Party the leading national 
delegation with 19 MEP seats, followed by the anti-euro German AfD (7), the Belgium N-VA 
(4) and the Eurosceptic Dansk Folkeparti (4).  
More radical groups both to the right (European Freedom and Democracy – EFD) and the left 
(Greens/EFA) have become much stronger in the new Parliament. The European Left’s 
staunch opposition to EU austerity measures and fiscal discipline during the election 
campaign struck a responsive chord with the electorate and the GUE-NGL increased its 
representation from 35 to 52 seats. The slight loss of the German Die Linke was well 
compensated by the good showing of Syriza in Greece (which won the elections in that 
country and got 6 seats) and the Spanish traditional IU (5) and new movement Podemos (5). 
To the right, UKIP won the elections in the UK and increased its participation in the EP from 
8 to 24 seats. Despite desertions of Lega Nord, the Finns and the Danish People’s parties, the 
decision of the 17 Italian MEPs from the 5-Star Movement to join has allowed the Eurosceptic 
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right-wing group to increase its size up to 48 seats.1 However, its already weak internal 
cohesion is likely to come under further pressure. The non-attached bench will also grow and 
host the 39 MEPs from the Le Pen-Wilder’s unsuccessful alliance.2 
Distribution of seats in the 6th, 7th and 8th terms of the European Parliament 
 6th EP : June2009  7th EP : May 2014 8th EP 
EPP 265 273 221 
S&D 184 196 191 
ALDE/ADLE 84 83 67 
Greens/EFA 55 57 50 
ECR 54 57 70 
GUE-NGL 35 35 52 
EFD 32 31 48 
NI 27 33 52 
TOTAL 736 765 751 
 
A smaller grand coalition 
In addition to the higher presence and visibility of radical Eurosceptic parties, the results will 
have important consequences for the formation of majorities to pass legislation and adopt 
decisions. The grand coalition between the EPP and the S&D will become a ‘must’ and, with 
only 412 seats, will require stronger internal discipline and support from the Liberals (and 
the Greens when possible). Alternative right or left coalitions will no longer be feasible. With 
358 seats, the right coalition made up of the EPP, ALDE and ECR MEPs will be insufficient 
where a majority of the component members (376) is required and very weak vis-à-vis the 
                                                     
1 The EFD will now be called EFDD, for Europe of Freedom and Direct Democracy, and the 5-Star 
Movement will have freedom of vote on environmental and climate issues. Other members of the group 
will be the Dutch CU, the Lithuanian TT, the Czech Svobodní, the Sweden Democrats and a dissident from 
Front National. 
2 The new alliance managed to draw in 39 MEPs from six different member states, namely, French Front 
National, Austrian FPÖ, Dutch PVV, Italian Lega Nord, Vlaams Belang and Polish KPN, and thus finished 
short by one in meeting the requirement to obtain representation in seven different member states in order 
to form a political group.  
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Council when it is not.3 With 360 seats, a left coalition made up of S&D, ALDE, Greens and 
GUE/NL would face the same problem. Moreover, the possibilities available to the grand 
coalition to expand beyond the Liberals and the Greens with the aim of reinforcing its 
position in the negotiations with the Council will diminish as a result of the growing divide 
with the ECR and GUE/NL groups. 
In the 2009-14 legislative term, the ECR matched the EPP in 59% of the roll call votes and was 
part of a winning majority in 55.75% of the cases, most times also including the S&D.4 The 
common understanding reached between the EPP and the ECR was substantial in policy 
areas such as international trade, internal market and industry, research and energy. ECR 
took part in 81.16% of all roll call votes, its member parties voted together in 86.65% of the 
cases, and its MEPs drafted 120 reports and 143 opinions. They also had a (highly reputed) 
committee chair. In the incoming Parliament, the ECR will be more powerful but predictably 
less cooperative. The number of committee chairs and rapporteurs will increase substantially 
whereas the new affiliations will weaken the group’s internal cohesion. The British 
Conservatives have reduced their weight in the group from 47% to below 30% and more 
radical Eurosceptic members have gained ground. The Polish Law & Justice party has also 
shored up its nationalist approach as a strategy to defeat the conservative government party. 
Moreover, the proposed nomination of Jean-Claude Juncker for the position of Commission 
President has reignited the fury of the Tories, who will now adopt a more critical attitude 
towards the EU in view of the national debate on UK membership and the (possible) 
referendum. All of this will make ECR’s participation in a grand coalition more complicated 
and unlikely, despite the stronger power that the group will wield in the Parliament.  
In the last five years, GUE/NGL took part in 83.01% of the total of roll call votes and its 
member parties voted together in 79.37% of the cases. Members of the group drafted 51 
reports and 64 opinions. GUE/NLE matched the S&D in 59.72% of the votes (20.03% 
excluding the EPP) and was part of a winning majority in 51.9% of the cases.5 Cooperation 
with the socialists was especially strong in the area of gender equality, development, and 
environment and public health. Despite its stronger position in the incoming Parliament, the 
group’s increasingly critical attitude towards the EU and its radical leftist discourse will 
complicate its engagement in a grand coalition. 
Although the mainstream political groups can be counted on to increase their cooperation to 
ensure that decision-making does not come to a deadlock, these elections have brought 
radical parties to the forefront, shoving the governability of the EP against the ropes. Taking 
into account the growing role of the EP in EU law- and decision-making and its 
responsibility to ensure democratic legitimacy at EU level, the grave situation warrants at 
least a serious debate on citizens’ increasing disenchantment with ‘politics as usual’ and the 
                                                     
3 A majority vote by its component members is required in order for the EP to take the following political 
actions: to elect the President of the Commission and carry out a motion of censure against the 
Commission, to modify the electoral law, to adopt an own-initiative legislative report, to revoke delegating 
powers and to object to delegated acts in the second reading of the OLP and in the budgetary procedures. 
A majority vote in the EP is also required to allow the European Council to move from unanimity to 
qualified majority or from a special to the ordinary legislative procedure in a specific area, and to approve 
the accession of new members.  
4 In only 20.72% of the occasions in which ECR and EPP voted together did the S&D absent itself from the 
coalition. Data source: Votewatch EU (www.votewatch.eu/).  
5 Data source: Votewatch EU (www.votewatch.eu/). 
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need of a common electoral law that promotes – as is the case at national level – 
governability and democratic standards.  
